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Abstract—In this paper, we study networked control systems
in the presence of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, namely
attacks that prevent transmissions over the communication
network. The control objective is to maximize frequency and
duration of the DoS attacks under which closed-loop stability
is not destroyed. Analog and digital predictor-based controllers
with state resetting are proposed, which achieve the considered
control objective for a general class of DoS signals. An example
is given to illustrate the proposed solution approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Owing to advances in computing and communication tech-
nologies, recent years witnessed a growing interest towards
cyber-physical systems (CPSs), i.e., systems where physical
processes are monitored/controlled via embedded computers
and networks, possibly with feedback loops that are im-
plemented on wireless platforms [1], [2]. The concept of
CPSs is certainly appealing for industrial process automation;
however, it raises many theoretical and practical challenges.
In particular, the concept of CPSs has triggered considerable
attention towards networked control in the presence of cyber
attacks. In fact, unlike general-purpose computing systems
where attacks limit their impact to the cyber realm, attacks
to CPSs can affect the physical world: if the process under
control is open-loop unstable, failures in the plant-controller
communication can result in environmental damages.
The concept of cyber-physical security mostly concerns
security against malicious attacks. There are varieties of
attacks such as Denial-of-Service attacks, zero-dynamics
attacks, bias injection attacks, to name a few [3]. The last
two are examples of attacks affecting the integrity of data,
while Denial-of-Service attacks are meant to compromise the
availability of data.
This paper is concerned with Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attacks. We consider a sampled-data control system in which
the measurement channel (sensor-to-controller channel) is
networked; the attacker objective is to induce closed-loop
instability by interrupting the plant-controller communica-
tion. In wireless networks, this can be caused by emitting
intentional noise, also known as jamming, examples being
constant, random and protocol-aware jamming [4]–[6]. It
is generally accepted that communication failures induced
by DoS can have a temporal profile quite different from
the one exhibited by genuine packet losses, as assumed in
the majority of studies on networked control; in particular,
communication failures induced by DoS need not follow a
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given class of probability distributions [7]. This raises new
theoretical challenges from the perspective of analysis as well
as control design.
In the literature, several contributions have been proposed
dealing with networked control under DoS. In [7], [8], the
authors consider the problem of finding optimal control and
attack strategies assuming a maximum number of jamming
actions over a prescribed (finite) control horizon. A similar
formulation is considered in [9], where the authors study
zero-sum games between controllers and strategic jammers.
In [10], [11], the authors consider DoS attacks in the form of
pulse-width modulated signals. The goal is to identify salient
features of the DoS signal such as maximum on/off cycle in
order to suitably schedule the transmission times. For the
case of periodic jamming (of unknown period and duration),
identification schemes are proposed for de-synchronizing the
transmission times from the DoS signal.
In [12], [13], a framework is introduced where no assump-
tion is made regarding the DoS attack underlying strategy. A
general attack model is considered that only constrains the
attacker action in time by posing limitations on the frequency
of DoS attacks and their duration. The main contribution
is an explicit characterization of frequency and duration
of the DoS attacks under which closed-loop stability can
be preserved by means of state-feedback policies. Building
on the results in [12], extensions have been considered
dealing with dynamic controllers [14], nonlinear [15] and
distributed [16] systems. Recently, a similar formulation has
been adopted in the context of DoS-resilient event-triggered
control [17]; see also [14].
From the perspective of securing robustness against DoS,
static feedback has inherent limitations. In fact, using static
feedback one generates control updates only when new
measurements become available. Intuitively, this limitation
can be overcome by considering dynamic controllers. In
particular, a natural approach is to equip the control system
with prediction capabilities so as reconstruct the missing
measurements from available data during the DoS periods.
Prompted by the above considerations, this paper discusses
the design of predictor-based controllers in the context of
DoS-resilient networked control. Inspired by recent results
on finite-time state observers [18], [19], we focus the at-
tention on impulsive-like predictors consisting of dynamical
observers with measurements-triggered state resetting. Both
analog and digital implementations are discussed, and com-
pared.
While the idea of using predictor-based controllers is
intuitive, the result is perhaps surprising. In fact, this paper
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shows that impulsive-like predictors make it possible to
maximize the amount of DoS that one can tolerate for the
class of DoS signals introduced in [12], [13].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
describe the framework of interest, and outline the paper
contribution. Section III presents the main results. We first
design analog predictor-based controllers and discuss the
conditions under which stability is guaranteed. Second, we
design digital predictor-based controllers and characterize
sampling rate of the digital device and stability conditions.
In Section IV, an example is discussed. Section V ends the
paper with concluding remarks and possible extensions to
the present research.
A. Notation
We denote by R the set of reals. Given α ∈ R, we let
R>α (R≥α) denote the set of reals greater than (greater than
or equal to) α. We let N0 denote the set of nonnegative
integers, N0 := {0, 1, . . .}. The prime denotes transpose.
Given a vector v ∈ Rn, ‖v‖ is its Euclidean norm. Given
a matrix M , ‖M‖ is its spectral norm. Given two sets A
and B, we denote by B\A the relative complement of A
in B, i.e., the set of all elements belonging to B, but not
to A. Given a measurable time function f : R≥0 7→ Rn
and a time interval [0, t) we denote the L∞ norm of f(·)
on [0, t) by ‖ft‖∞ := sups∈[0,t)‖f(s)‖. Given a measurable
time function f : R≥0 7→ Rn we say that f is bounded if its
L∞ norm is finite.
II. THE FRAMEWORK
A. Process dynamics and network
The process to be controlled is given by x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) + d(t)y(t) = x(t) + n(t)
x(0) = x0
(1)
where t ∈ R≥0; x ∈ Rn is the state, u ∈ Rm is the
control input and y ∈ Rp is measurement vector; A and B
are matrices of appropriate size with (A,B) is stabilizable;
d ∈ Rn and n ∈ Rp are unknown (bounded) disturbance and
noise signals, respectively.
We assume that the measurement channel is networked
and subject to Denial-of-Service (DoS) status. The former
implies that measurements are sent only at discrete time
instants. Let {tk}k∈N0 = {t0, t1, . . .} denote the sequence
of transmission attempts. Throughout the paper, we assume
for simplicity that the transmission attempts are carried out
periodically with period ∆, i.e.,
tk+1 − tk = ∆, k ∈ N0 (2)
with t0 = 0 by convention. The more general case of
aperiodic transmission policies can be pursued along the
lines of [13]. We refer to DoS as the phenomenon for
which some transmission attempts may fail. In this paper,
we do not distinguish between transmissions that fail due
to channel unavailability (e.g., caused by radio-frequency
jammers in protocols employing carrier sensing as medium
access policy) and transmissions that fail due to DoS-induced
packet corruption.
We shall denote by {zm}m∈N0 = {z0, z1, . . .}, z0 ≥ t0,
the sequence of time instants at which samples of y are
successfully transmitted.
B. Control objective
The objective is to design ∆ and a controller K, possibly
dynamic, in such a way that the closed-loop stability is
maintained despite the occurrence of DoS periods. In this
paper, by closed-loop stability we mean that all the signals
in the closed-loop system remain bounded for any initial
condition x0 and bounded noise and disturbance signals,
and converge to zero in the event that noise and disturbance
signals converge to zero.
C. Assumptions −Time-constrained DoS
Clearly, the problem in question does not have a solution
if the DoS amount is allowed to be arbitrary. Following
[13], we consider a general DoS model that constrains the
attacker action in time by only posing limitations on the
frequency of DoS attacks and their duration. Let {hn}n∈N0 ,
h0 ≥ 0, denote the sequence of DoS off/on transitions, i.e.,
the time instants at which DoS exhibits a transition from
zero (transmissions are possible) to one (transmissions are
not possible). Hence,
Hn := {hn} ∪ [hn, hn + τn[ (3)
represents the n-th DoS time-interval, of a length τn ∈ R≥0,
over which the network is in DoS status. If τn = 0, then Hn
takes the form of a single pulse at hn. Given τ, t ∈ R≥0 with
t ≥ τ , let n(τ, t) denote the number of DoS off/on transitions
over [τ, t[, and let
Ξ(τ, t) :=
⋃
n∈N0
Hn
⋂
[τ, t] (4)
denote the subset of [τ, t] where the network is in DoS status.
We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: (DoS frequency). There exist constants η ∈
R≥0 and τD ∈ R>∆ such that
n(τ, t) ≤ η + t− τ
τD
(5)
for all τ, t ∈ R≥0 with t ≥ τ . 
Assumption 2: (DoS duration). There exist constants κ ∈
R≥0 and T ∈ R>1 such that
|Ξ(τ, t)| ≤ κ+ t− τ
T
(6)
for all τ, t ∈ R≥0 with t ≥ τ . 
Remark 1: The rationale behind Assumption 1 is that
occasionally DoS can occur at a rate faster than ∆ but
the average interval between consecutive DoS triggering is
greater than ∆. By (5), one may in fact have intervals where
hn+1 − hn ≤ ∆, hence intervals where n(τ, t) is greater
than or equal to the maximum number d(t − τ)/∆e of
transmission attempts that may occur within [τ, t[. However,
over large time windows, i.e., when the term (t − τ)/τD is
predominant compared to η, the number of DoS triggering is
at most of the order of (t− τ)/τD. Assumption 2 expresses
a similar requirement with respect to the DoS duration. In
fact, it expresses the property that, on the average, the time
instants over which communication is interrupted do not
exceed a certain fraction of time, as specified by the constant
T ∈ R>1. Similarly to η, the constant κ ∈ R≥0 plays the
role of a regularization term. It is needed because during
a DoS interval, one has |Ξ(hn, hn + τn)| = τn > τn/T
since T > 1. Accordingly, κ serves to make (6) consistent.
Assumptions 1 and 2 are general enough to capture many
different types of DoS attacks, including trivial, periodic,
random and protocol-aware jamming attacks [5], [6]; see
[13] for a more detailed discussion. 
Remark 2: Unless other conditions are imposed, both the
requirements τD > ∆ and T > 1 are necessary in order
for the stabilization problem to be well-posed. In fact, if
τD = ∆ then the DoS signal characterized by the pair
(hn, τn) = (tk, 0) satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2 with η = 1,
κ = 0 and T =∞ but destroys any communication attempt.
Likewise, in case T = 1 then the DoS signal characterized
by (h0, τ0) = (0,∞) satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2 with
η = 1, κ = 0 and τD =∞ but destroys any communication
attempt. 
D. Previous work and paper contribution
In [13], the problem of achieving robustness against DoS
has been analyzed for the case of static feedback laws
u(t) =
 0, t ∈ [0, z0[Ky(zm), t ∈ [zm, zm+1[, m ∈ N0 (7)
where K is a state-feedback matrix designed in such a way
that all the eigenvalues of Φ = A + BK have negative
real part. For this scenario, a characterization of stabilizing
transmission policies was given. We summarize below this
result.
Theorem 1: Consider the process (1) under a control
action as in (7). Given any positive definite symmetric matrix
Q, let P denote the solution of the Lyapunov equation
Φ′P + P Φ + Q = 0. Let the transmission policy in (2)
be such that
∆ ≤ 1
µA
log
[(
σ
1 + σ
)
1
max{‖Φ‖, 1}µA + 1
]
(8)
when µA > 0, and
∆ ≤
(
σ
1 + σ
)
1
max{‖Φ‖, 1} (9)
when µA ≤ 0, where µA is the logarithmic norm of A and
σ is a positive constant satisfying γ1−σγ2 > 0, where γ1 is
equal to the smallest eigenvalue of Q and γ2 := ‖2PBK‖.
Then, the closed-loop system is stable for any DoS sequence
satisfying Assumption 1 and 2 with arbitrary η and κ, and
with τD and T such that
1
T
+
∆
τD
<
ω1
ω1 + ω2
(10)
where ω1 := (γ1 − γ2σ)/2α2 and ω2 := 2γ2/α1, where
α1 and α2 denote the smallest and largest eigenvalue of P ,
respectively. 
Inequality (10) provides an explicit characterization of the
robustness degree against DoS that static feedback policies
can achieve. This characterization relates the DoS parameters
τD and T with the transmission period ∆ and the control
system parameters via ω1 and ω2, which depend on choice
of the state-feedback matrix K.
Clearly, increasing the right-hand side of (10) increases the
amount of DoS that the control system can tolerate. However,
with static feedback it is difficult to obtain large values for the
right-hand side of (10). The underlying reason is that static
feedback has the inherent limitation of generating control
updates only when new measurements become available,
and this possibly reflects in small values for the right-hand
side of (10). Intuitively, this limitation can be overcome by
equipping the controller with prediction capabilities, with
the idea of compensating DoS by reconstructing the missing
measurements from available data. In the next section, it is
shown that using predictor-based controllers one can achieve
closed-loop stability whenever
1
T
+
∆
τD
< 1 (11)
holds true.
While the idea of using predictor-based controllers is
intuitive, the result is perhaps surprising. In fact, this is the
best possible bound that one can achieve for DoS signals
satisfying Assumption 1 and 2. Indeed, if we denote by
S(τD, T ) the class of DoS signals for which (11) is not
satisfied, then S(τD, T ) does always contain DoS signals
for which stability is destroyed. Examples are DoS signals
characterized by (τD, T ) = (∆,∞) and (τD, T ) = (∞, 1);
cf. Remark 2.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In Section III-A, we discuss one technical result which
is fundamental for the developments of the paper. The
theoretical analysis for analog predictor-based controllers is
presented in Section III-B, while in Section III-C we will
further extend our work to digital implementations.
A. Key lemma
The following lemma relates DoS parameters and time
elapsing between successful transmissions.
Lemma 1: Consider a transmission policy as in (2), along
with a DoS signal satisfying Assumption 1 and 2. If (11)
holds true, then the sequence of successful transmissions
satisfies z0 ≤ Q and zm+1 − zm ≤ Q + ∆ for all m ∈ N0,
where
Q = (κ+ η∆)
(
1− 1
T
− ∆
τD
)−1
(12)
Proof. We first define some auxiliary quantities. Let
H¯n := {hn} ∪ [hn, hn + τn + ∆[ represent the n-th DoS
interval prolonged by one sampling. For any interval [τ, t],
let Ξ¯(τ, t) :=
⋃
n∈N0 H¯n
⋂
[τ, t] and Θ¯(τ, t) := [τ, t]\Ξ¯(τ, t).
The main idea for the proof relies on the following argument.
Given hn, we have
|Θ¯(hn, t)| = t− hn − |Ξ¯(hn, t)|
≥ t− hn − |Ξ(hn, t)| − n(hn, t)∆
≥ (t− hn)
(
1− 1
T
− ∆
τD
)
− κ− η∆ (13)
for all t ≥ hn where the first inequality follows from the
definition of the set Ξ¯(τ, t) while the second inequality
follows from Assumption 1 and 2. Notice that |Θ¯(hn, t)| > 0
implies that [hn, t] contains at least one successful trans-
mission. This is because |Θ¯(hn, t)| > 0 implies that [hn, t]
contains a DoS-free interval of length greater than ∆. We
claim that a successful transmission does always occur within
[hn, hn+Q]. To this end, suppose that the claim is false and
let t∗ denote the last transmission attempt occurring within
[hn, hn + Q]. Since t∗ is unsuccessful |Θ¯(hn, t∗)| = 0.
Moreover, this also implies |Θ¯(hn, t∗ + ∆)| = 0. This is
because, if t∗ is unsuccessful then it must be contained in
a DoS interval, say Hq , so that [t∗, t∗ + ∆[⊆ H¯q . However,
since t∗ + ∆ > hn +Q we also have
|Θ¯(hn, t∗ + ∆)|
> Q
(
1− 1
T
− ∆
τD
)
− κ− η∆ = 0
which leads to a contradiction.
Based on these arguments, the proof can be readily fi-
nalized. Consider first z0 ≤ Q. If t0 is successful then the
claim holds trivially. Suppose instead that t0 is unsuccessful,
i.e., h0 = 0. By the above arguments we have one successful
transmission no later than h0+Q and, hence, no later than Q.
Consider next zm+1−zm ≤ Q+∆. If zm+∆ is successful,
then the claim holds trivially. Suppose instead that zm + ∆
is unsuccessful. Since zm is successful a DoS must occur
within ]zm, zm+∆]. Hence, we must have hn ∈]zm, zm+∆]
for some n ∈ N0. By the above arguments we have one
successful transmission no later than hn +Q and, hence, no
later than zm +Q+ ∆. 
Remark 3: In the absence of DoS, when T = τD = ∞
and κ = η = 0, Q becomes zero. In fact, in the absence
of DoS, Lemma 1 simply describes the functioning of a
standard periodic transmission policy. 
B. Analog predictor-based controller
The considered predictor-based controller consists of two
parts: prediction and state-feedback. As for the prediction
part, we consider an impulsive predictor, whose dynamics
are given by{
˙ˆx(t) = Axˆ(t) +Bu(t), t 6= zm
xˆ(t) = y(t), t = zm
(14)
with initial condition
xˆ(0) =
{
y(0), if z0 = 0
0, otherwise
(15)
where t ∈ R≥0 and m ∈ N0. By construction the solution xˆ
is continuous from the right everywhere.
The state-feedback matrix is an arbitrary matrix K such
that all the eigenvalues of Φ = A+ BK have negative real
part. Then, the control input applied to the process (and the
predictor) is given by
u(t) = Kxˆ(t) (16)
where t ∈ R≥0.
The predictor differs from a classical asymptotic observer
due to the measurements-triggered jumps in the state. The
reason for considering an impulsive-like predictor rather than
an asymptotic one is the following. Let
e(t) := xˆ(t)− x(t) (17)
where t ∈ R≥0. The process dynamics can be therefore
expressed as
x˙(t) = Φx(t) +BKe(t) + d(t) (18)
where t ∈ R≥0. Consider any symmetric positive definite
matrix Q, and let P be the solution of the Lyapunov equation
Φ′P + PΦ +Q = 0. Let V (x) = x′Px. Its derivative along
the solutions to (18), satisfies
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ − γ1‖x(t)‖2 + γ2‖x(t)‖‖e(t)‖
+ γ3‖x(t)‖‖d(t)‖ (19)
for all t ∈ R≥0, where γ1 is the smallest eigenvalue of Q,
γ2 := ‖2PBK‖ and γ3 := ‖2P‖. From the last expression
one sees that stability depends on the magnitude of e. In this
respect, the dynamics of e obeys
e˙(t) = Ae(t)− d(t), t 6= zm
e(t) = n(t), t = zm
(20)
where t ∈ R≥0 and m ∈ N0. One sees from the second
equation of (20) that resetting the predictor state makes it
possible to reset e to a bounded value whenever a new
measurement becomes available. In turns, Lemma 1 ensures
that a resetting does always occur in a finite time. These two
properties guarantee boundedness of e for all t ≥ z0.
In particular, we have the following result.
Lemma 2: Consider the process (1) with predictor-based
controller (14)-(16) under a transmission policy as in (2).
Consider any DoS sequence satisfying Assumption 1 and 2
with arbitrary η and κ, and with τD and T satisfying (11).
Then, there exists a positive constant ρ such that
‖e(t)‖ ≤ ρ ‖wt‖∞ (21)
for all t ∈ R≥z0 , where w = [d′ n′]′.
Proof. Consider any interval [zm, zm+1[, m ∈ N0. By (20),
we have
e(t) = eA(t−zm)n(zm)−
∫ t
zm
eA(t−τ)d(τ)dτ (22)
for all t ∈ [zm, zm+1[.
Let now µA denote the logarithmic norm of A. If µA ≤ 0,
we obtain
‖e(t)‖ ≤ ‖n(zm)‖+ ‖dt‖∞(t− zm)
≤ ‖nt‖∞ + ‖dt‖∞(Q+ ∆) (23)
for all t ∈ [zm, zm+1[, where the second inequality follows
from Lemma 1. If instead µA > 0, we have
‖e(t)‖ ≤ eµA(t−zm)‖n(zm)‖+ 1
µA
(
eµA(t−zm) − 1
)
‖dt‖∞
≤ eµA(Q+∆)‖nt‖∞ + 1
µA
(
eµA(Q+∆) − 1
)
‖dt‖∞
(24)
where the second inequality follows again from Lemma 1.
Hence, we conclude that the claim holds with
ρ := 1 +Q+ ∆ (25)
if µA ≤ 0, and with
ρ :=
(
1 +
1
µA
)
eµA(Q+∆) (26)
if µA > 0. 
Exploiting Lemma 2, we obtain the following stability
result for analog controller implementations.
Theorem 2: Consider the process (1) with predictor-based
controller (14)-(16) under a transmission policy as in (2).
Then, the closed-loop system is stable for any DoS sequence
satisfying Assumption 1 and 2 with arbitrary η and κ, and
with τD and T satisfying (11).
Proof. Consider the closed-loop dynamics for all t ≥ z0.
Notice that z0 exists finite by virtue of Lemma 1. In view
of (19) and Lemma 2, we have
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ −γ1‖x(t)‖2 + γ4‖x(t)‖‖wt‖∞ (27)
for all t ∈ R≥z0 , where γ4 := γ2ρ+ γ3.
Observe that for any positive real β, the Young’s inequality
yields
2‖x(t)‖‖wt‖∞ ≤ 1
β
‖x(t)‖2 + β‖wt‖∞ (28)
Using this inequality with β = γ4/γ1, straightforward
calculations yield
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ −ω1V (x(t)) + γ5‖wt‖2∞ (29)
for all t ∈ R≥z0 , where ω1 := γ1/(2α2) and γ5 := γ24/(2γ1),
where α2 denotes the largest eigenvalue of P . Accordingly,
we obtain
V (x(t))≤ e−ω1(t−z0)V (x(z0))) + γ5
ω1
‖wt‖2∞ (30)
for all t ∈ R≥z0 . This shows that x remains bounded because
z0 exists finite in view of Lemma 1. In turns, this implies
that also xˆ remains bounded. Moreover, in the event that
disturbance and noise signals converge to zero, (20) implies
that e converges to zero. In turns, (19) implies that both x
and xˆ also converge to zero. 
Remark 4: The considered controller yields quite strong
stability properties, namely global exponential stability with
linear bounds on the map from the disturbance and noise
signals to the process state. It is also interesting to observe
that, as long as the triplet (τD, T,∆) satisfies (11), ∆ can
be chosen arbitrarily (though large values of ∆ may affect
the performance via γ5, which depends on ρ). In particular,
in the absence of DoS when T = τD = ∞ and κ = η = 0,
then (11) is satisfied for any bounded value of ∆. This is
due to the controller state resetting mechanism. 
C. Digital predictor-based controller
In this section, we extend the control algorithm to a digital
implementation. The substantial difference between analog
and digital implementations is that in the latter the control
action can be updated only at a finite rate. Because of this,
Lemma 2 does not hold any longer. As we will see, in order
to recover a boundedness inequality similar to the one in
Lemma 2, constraints have to be enforced on the sampling
rate of the digital controller.
Consider a digital controller with sampling rate
δ =
∆
b
(31)
where b is any positive integer. Choosing the controller
sampling rate as a submultiple of ∆ makes it possible to
implement the controller as a sampled-data version of (14),
which is synchronized with the network transmission rate.
Let Aδ = eAδ and Bδ =
∫ δ
0
eAτBdτ . The digital predictor
is given by
xˆ((q + 1)δ) = Aδα(qδ) +Bδu(qδ)
α(qδ) =
 y(qδ), if qδ = zmxˆ(qδ), otherwise
xˆ(0) = 0
(32)
where q ∈ N0.
The control action is given by
u(qδ) = Kα(qδ). (33)
where q ∈ N0.
Similar to the analog implementation, also the digital
implementation is equipped with a state resetting mecha-
nism. Due to the discrete nature of the update equations,
the resetting mechanism is implemented using an auxiliary
variable α.
The stability analysis follows the same steps as in the
previous case. Let
φ(t) := α(qδ)− x(t) (34)
where t ∈ Iq := [qδ, (q + 1)δ[, q ∈ N0. Hence, the process
dynamics satisfies
x˙(t) = Φx(t) +BKφ(t) + d(t) (35)
for all t ∈ Iq .
Given any symmetric positive definite matrix Q, let P be
the solution of the Lyapunov equation Φ′P + PΦ +Q = 0.
Let V (x) = x′Px. Its derivative along the solutions to (35),
satisfies
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ − γ1‖x(t)‖2 + γ2‖x(t)‖‖φ(t)‖
+ γ3‖x(t)‖‖d(t)‖ (36)
for all t ∈ Iq , where γ1 is the smallest eigenvalue of Q,
γ2 := ‖2PBK‖ and γ3 := ‖2P‖. As in the previous case,
stability depends on the magnitude of φ. In this respect, the
dynamics of φ satisfies
φ˙(t) = −x˙(t)
= Aφ(t)− Φα(qδ)− d(t), t 6= zm
φ(t) = n(t), t = zm
(37)
for all t ∈ Iq .
The differential equation in (37) differs from its analog
counterpart in (20) due to the extra term Φα(qδ). Because
of this, Lemma 2 breaks down. In order to recover a property
similar to the one established in Lemma 2, constraints have
to be enforced on the sampling rate of the digital controller.
This is consistent with intuition, and simply indicates that
the rate of control updates has to be sufficiently fast. In
this respect, letting δ = ∆/b allows to differentiate between
controller sampling rate and transmission rate, maintaining
∆ possibly large.
Lemma 3: Consider the process (1) with predictor-based
controller (32)-(33) under a transmission policy as in (2).
Consider any DoS sequence satisfying Assumption 1 and 2
with arbitrary η and κ, and with τD and T satisfying (11).
Let the controller sampling rate be such that
δ ≤ 1
µA
log
[(
σ
1 + σ
)
1
max{‖Φ‖, 1}µA + 1
]
(38)
when µA > 0, and
δ ≤
(
σ
1 + σ
)
1
max{‖Φ‖, 1} (39)
when µA ≤ 0, where µA is the logarithmic norm of A and
σ is a positive constant satisfying γ1−σγ2 > 0, where γ1 is
equal to the smallest eigenvalue of Q and γ2 := ‖2PBK‖.
Then, there exists a positive constant ρ˜ such that
‖φ(t)‖ ≤ σ‖x(t)‖+ ρ˜ ‖wt‖∞ (40)
for all t ∈ R≥z0 .
Proof. Consider any interval [zm, zm+1[, m ∈ N0, and any
controller sampling instant qδ ∈ [zm, zm+1[. The proof is
divided into two steps. In the first step, we provide an upper
bound on the error dynamics φ at the controller sampling
time qδ. Second, we provide an upper bound on the error
dynamics φ between controller inter-samplings. In turns,
this provides an upper bound on φ over the whole interval
[zm, zm+1[, and, hence, over R≥z0 .
For the sake of convenience, we will relate a controller
update instant qδ with a successful transmission instant zm
via the expression
qδ = zm + pδ (41)
where p ∈ N0. This is always possible since δ = ∆/b.
We start by deriving an upper bound on φ(qδ). It is simple
to verify that the dynamics of the variable α in the controller
equations satisfies
α(qδ) = Apδ α(zm)
+
p−1∑
k=0
Ap−k−1δ Bδ u(zm + kδ) (42)
In fact, between two successful transmissions, α coincides
with xˆ, which evolves like a classical linear time-invariant
discrete-time system.
On the other hand,
x(t) = eA(t−zm)x(zm) +
∫ t
zm
eA(t−τ)Bu(τ)dτ
+
∫ t
zm
eA(t−τ)d(τ)dτ (43)
for all t ∈ [zm, zm+1[.
Combining the two expressions, we get
φ(qδ) = α(qδ)− x(qδ)
= eA(qδ−zm)n(zm)−
∫ qδ
zm
eA(qδ−τ)d(τ)dτ
(44)
where we exploited the relation Apδ = e
Apδ = eA(qδ−zm),
and the fact that∫ qδ
zm
eA(qδ−τ)Bu(τ)dτ
=
p−1∑
k=0
[∫ zm+(k+1)δ
zm+kδ
eA(qδ−τ)Bdτ
]
u(zm + kδ)
=
p−1∑
k=0
eAδ(p−k−1)
[∫ δ
0
eAsBds
]
u(zm + kδ)
=
p−1∑
k=0
Ap−k−1δ Bδu(zm + kδ) (45)
where the second equality is obtained using the change of
variable s = zm + (k + 1)δ − τ .
We can now obtain an upper bound on φ(qδ). Specifically,
since by hypothesis qδ ∈ [zm, zm+1[, we have
‖φ(qδ)‖ ≤ ρ‖wqδ‖∞ (46)
where ρ is defined as in Lemma 2.
We can now provide an upper bound on φ between
controller inter-samplings. Let
f(t− qδ) :=
∫ t
qδ
eA(t−τ)dτ (47)
Integrating (37) over the interval Iq , we obtain
‖φ(t)‖ ≤ ‖eA(t−qδ)‖‖φ(qδ)‖
+ f(t− qδ)‖dt‖∞ + f(t− qδ)‖Φ‖‖α(qδ)‖
≤ ρˆ ρ‖wt‖∞
+ f(t− qδ)‖dt‖∞ + f(t− qδ)‖Φ‖‖α(qδ)‖
≤ ρˆ ρ‖wt‖∞
+ f(t− qδ)‖dt‖∞
+ f(t− qδ)‖Φ‖(‖φ(t)‖+ ‖x(t)‖) (48)
for all t ∈ Iq , where ρˆ := max{eµAδ, 1}.
Let κ1 := max{‖Φ‖, 1}. Observe that f(0) = 0 and that
f(t − qδ) is monotonically increasing with t. Accordingly,
any positive real δ such that
f(δ) ≤ 1
κ1
σ
(1 + σ)
, (49)
ensures (40) with
ρ˜ := σ + ρˆρ(1 + σ) (50)
We finally derive an explicit expression for δ. If µA > 0,
we have
f(δ) =
1
µA
(eµAδ − 1) (51)
and (38) yields the desired result. If instead µA ≤ 0, then
f(δ) ≤ δ, and (39) yields the desired result.
This concludes the proof. 
Based on Lemma 3 the following result can be stated,
which provides a natural counterpart of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3: Consider the process (1) with predictor-based
controller (32)-(33) under a transmission policy as in (2).
Let the controller sampling rate be chosen as in Lemma 3.
Then, the closed-loop system is stable for any DoS sequence
satisfying Assumption 1 and 2 with arbitrary η and κ, and
with τD and T satisfying (11).
Proof. Consider the closed-loop dynamics for all t ≥ z0.
Substituting (40) into (36) yields
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ −(γ1 − σγ2)‖x(t)‖2
+(γ2ρ˜+ γ3)‖x(t)‖‖wt‖∞ (52)
for all t ∈ Rz0 , where γ1 − σγ2 is strictly positive by
construction. The conclusion is that the proof Theorem 2
carries over to Theorem 3 with γ1 and γ4 replaced by
γ1 − σγ2 and γ2ρ˜+ γ3, respectively. 
Compared with the analog implementation, one sees that
the digital implementation does only require a proper choice
of the controller sampling rate. On the other hand, it achieves
the same robustness properties of the analog implementation.
By Lemma 3, admissible values for the controller sampling
rate can be explicitly computed from the parameters of the
control system.
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Fig. 1. Simulation results for the example. Top: Analog controller; Center:
Digital Controller; Bottom: Pure static feedback.
IV. EXAMPLE
The numerical example is taken from [20]. The system to
be controlled is open-loop unstable and is characterized by
the matrices
A =
[
1 1
0 1
]
, B =
[
1 0
0 1
]
(53)
The state-feedback matrix is given by
K =
[ −2.1961 −0.7545
−0.7545 −2.7146
]
(54)
The control system parameters are γ1 = 1, γ2 = 2.1080,
α1 = 0.2779, α2 = 0.4497, ‖Φ‖ = 1.9021 and µA = 1.5.
Disturbance d and noise n are random signals with uniform
distribution in [−0.1, 0.1].
The network transmission rate is given by ∆ = 0.1s.
Both analog and digital controllers are considered. As for
the digital implementation, in accordance with Lemma 3,
we must select σ such that σ < 0.4744. According to (38),
we obtain the constraint δ < 0.1508. We select δ = 0.01s so
that δ is sufficiently small, and in order to synchronize the
controller sampling rate with ∆.
Figure 1 shows simulation results, which compare the
static feedback law (7) with the predictor-based controllers
(14)-(16) and (32)-(33). We consider a sustained DoS attack
with variable period and duty cycle, generated randomly.
Over a simulation horizon of 50s, the DoS signal yields
|Ξ(0, 50)| = 38.8s and n(0, 50) = 52. This corresponds to
values (averaged over 50s) of τD ≈ 0.96 and T ≈ 1.29,
and ∼ 80% of transmission failures. For the predictor-based
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Fig. 2. Simulation results for the example in case disturbance and noise
are random signals with uniform distribution in [−0.01, 0.01]. Top: Analog
controller; Bottom: Digital Controller.
controllers, the stability requirement is satisfied since
∆
τD
+
1
T
≈ 0.8793 (55)
On the other hand, the DoS parameters do not satisfy the
stability requirement for the pure static feedback law, which
is (cf. (10))
∆
τD
+
1
T
< 0.0321 (56)
The theoretical bound for the case of pure static feedback
is conservative (indeed, simulations show that (7) ensures
closed-loop stability for the system in (53) up to ∼ 40% of
transmission failures). Nonetheless, the improvement given
by predictor-based controllers is significant. In fact, while the
system undergoes instability with (7), the performance level
provided by (14)-(16) and (32)-(33) is very high despite the
sustained DoS attack.
It is worth noting that while stability is independent on the
magnitude of disturbance and noise signals, performance is
not. As shown in Figure 2, noise significantly impacts on the
accuracy of the state estimate, and, hence, on the closed-loop
behavior during DoS status; cf. the paper conclusions.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we investigated the problem of designing
DoS-resilient control systems. It was shown that the use of
dynamical observers with state resetting mechanism makes it
possible to maximize the amount of DoS that one can tolerate
for a general class of DoS signals. Both analog and digital
implementations have been discussed, the latter requiring a
suitable choice of the controller sampling rate.
The results presented in this paper can be extended in
various directions. We envision the use of a similar control
architecture for the case of partial state measurements, via
the approach considered in [18]. Another interesting study
concerns performance robustness against measurement noise,
which is the main factor affecting the quality of the process
state estimation. The recent results in [21] may prove relevant
in this regard.
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